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The need to encourage venture capital is often adduced as an important
justification for reducing the capital gains tax rate. For example, Norman
Ture writes that
For both outside investors and entrepreneurs [in new businesses] the reward
sought is primarily an increase in the value of the equity investment. For outside
investors in particular, it is important to be able to realize the appreciated capital
and to transfer it into promising new ventures. Raising the tax on capital gains
blunts the inducement for undertaking these ventures.
This paper investigates the links between capital gains taxation and the
amount of venture capital activity. It provides a framework for analyzing
the channels through which tax policy affects start-up firms.
The first section presents time-series data on venture capital invest-
ment hi the United States. Beyond the well-known observation that
venture investment increased in the early 1980s, perhaps coincidentally
after the capital gains tax reduction of 1978, this section compares the
growth rate of venture capital activity in the United States, Britain, and
Canada. The U.S. venture industry expanded much more quickly than
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those of the other nations during the early 1980s, but its growth has been
slower since the 1986 Tax Reform Act raised the tax rate on capital gains.
There are two potential links between capital gains taxation and start-
up firm activity. The first focuses on the supply of venture funds and on
the tax treatment of venture investors, while the second highlights the
impact of tax policy on the behavior of entrepreneurs. This paper consid-
ers each aspect in turn. The second section investigates how taxation
affects the supply of venture funds. It shows that fewer than half of
venture investors face individual capital gains tax liability on their gains
from venture investment. Moreover, only about 10 percent of the inves-
tors in organized venture capital partnerships are individuals. Funds
committed by untaxed investors have expanded most rapidly in the
years following 1978. A significant fraction of the funds supplied to
venture firms should therefore be unaffected by the individual capital
gains tax.
Section three examines the other channel through which capital gains
taxes could affect start-up firms: the incentives of entrepreneurs. This
section argues that the effective capital gains tax rate is below the statu-
tory rate because investors and entrepreneurs can defer realizing their
gains. For individuals who forgo wage and salary income and accept
compensation through corporate stock and related gain-producing in-
struments, the individual tax burden on capital gains may have impor-
tant incentive effects.
While the first three sections consider the influence of taxation on
venture capital, section four considers the importance of venture capital
in the flow of realized gains. Less than one-third of reported gains are
the result of appreciation of corporate equity. Only a small fraction of
these gains are related to venture capital investments, underscoring the
substantial benefits to sectors other than new business that would be
provided by an across-the-board capital gains tax cut. While the paper
draws no conclusions about the ultimate need for subsidies to venture
capital, it emphasizes that reducing the tax rate on all gains is a relatively
blunt device for encouraging venture investment.
1. CAPITAL GAINS TAXES AND VENTURE CAPITAL:
IS THERE A LINK?
The link between capital gains taxation and venture capital activity is
often supported by citing the rapid growth of venture financing after the
1978 and 1981 reductions in capital gains tax rates. Table 1 shows the net
commitment of venture capital funds during the period 1969-4987, mea-
sured in 1987 dollars. The level of venture funding increased significantlyTABLE 1
Supply of Venture Capital Financing, 1969-1987
Source: Column 1, Venture Economics, Venture Capital Yearbook, 1988, p. 17. Column 2, U.S. Treasury
(1985), p. 37, updated by the author.
after each tax reform, from an average of $380 million in 1976-1978 to
$1.01 billion in 1979-1981 and $3.93 billion in 1982-1984. The data also
suggest some reduction in venture capital funding between 1969 and
subsequent years, coincident with the 1969 capital gains tax increase,
although adequate pre-1969 data are not available.
Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which raised individual capital gains
tax rates from 20 percent to 28 percent (or in some cases to 33 percent),
venture funding has been stable. Total venture commitments increased 6
percent between 1986 and 1987, and preliminary 1988 data suggest that
this level has at least been maintained through 1988.2 The recent growth
of venture capital investment in other nations, however, suggests that
the post-1986 U.S. performance may reflect a negative effect of tax re-
form. In the U.K., the flow of venture capital commitments nearly dou-
bled between 1986 and 1987. In Canada, venture funding rose even
2Venture Capital Journal, July 1988, p. 13.
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more dramatically, from $209 to $800 million.3 While the growth of yen-
hire capital in Canada and Britain may in part reflect the maturation of
their venture capital industries, it provides a useful contrast to the recent
U.S. experience.
The inverse correlation between capital gains tax rates and venture
capital funding in the U.S. is not conclusive evidence of a link between
the two. A variety of other factors, particularly the Department of La-
bor's 1978 decision to relax the "Prudent Man Rule" that had previously
obstructed pension fund investment in high-risk start-up ventures,
could also account for some of the variation in venture capital activity.4
The Canadian experience during the last decade provides an informative
control for evaluating the influence of capital gains tax reductions on
venture capital. In the decade between 1976 and 1986, the stock of com-
mitments to the U.S. venture capital industry rose at a compound an-
nual rate of 17.1 percent. Measured in constant dollars, the pooi of
venture capital funds in 1986 was 4.85 times as large as the pooi one
decade earlier. In Canada, by comparison, the annual growth rate of
venture funds was only 5.7 percent, so that in 1986 the pool of funds was
1.75 times as large as in 1976. While international comparisons are diffi-
cult because of problems in controlling for institutional differences, the
finding that venture capital investment grew more rapidly in the United
States, the country that reduced its capital gains tax rate, is further
supporting evidence for a potential link between capital gains taxation
and venture capital.
Capital gains tax rates and venture capital could be linked in either or
both of two ways. First, reductions in capital gains taxes could raise the
supply of venture capital funds by raising the aftertax returns from invest-
ing in assets that yield capital gains rather than dividends or interest
income. This view implicitly assumes that taxable individuals supply a
substantial share of the funds committed to venture capital. Second,
reductions in capital gains taxes could increase the demand for venture
capital funds by raising the number of entrepreneurs who decide to start
new firms, and making it easier for these managers to attractemployees.
Venture Capital Journal, August 1988, p. 10, and data provided by Venture Economics
Canada. Anecdotal evidence suggests some qualitative changes in the U.S. venture capital
industry since 1986. Schrage (1988) reports that domestic venture capital funds are focus-
ing more on late-stage "mezzanine" financing and less on start-up financing than in previ-
ous years. Foreign investors are apparently providing a growing share of start-up funding.
4 The rise of start-up firms is also in part attributable to changes in technological opportuni-
ties, which induced some changes in the industrial mix of the U.S. economy. The Congres-
sional Budget Office (1985) has argued that the growth of several high-technology indus-
tries can be explained this way and that the growth of these industries had begun before
the capital gains tax reduction of 1978.Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation51
The next two sections address each of these issues in turn, assessing
where possible the quantitative importance of taxation for the level of
venture capital activity.
2. CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION AND THE SUPPLY OF
VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS
Probably the most common account of the link between taxation and
venture capital activity focuses on the investors who supply funds to
start-up firms. If these investors are individuals, as opposed to institu-
tional investors such as pension funds or universities, then changes in
the capital gains tax rate may affect the relative return on venture invest-
ments and on more traditional investments such as bonds. To assess the
potential importance of capital gains tax changes, this section considers
the source of funds for start-up enterprises.
Start-up firms receive capital from many sources. The corporate
founder and other employees and affiliates contribute capital, much of
this in the form of equity that is ultimately subject to individual capital
gains taxation. Unfortunately, there is little systematic evidence on the
financial structure of new firms. Table 2 presents evidence from a some-
what dated study on the debt, equity, and ownership structure of start-
up enterprises. In 1976, organized venture capitalists accounted for less
than 15 percent of total funding, although their share has undoubtedly
grown in subsequent years. By comparison, for technology-based firms,
TABLE 2:
Capital Structure of Start-Up Enterprises
Notes: The "Other investors" category includes investors who could not be identified, but who may
have in fact been in other categories.
Source: Charles River Associates, An Analysis of Venture Capital Market Imperfections, as cited in U.S.
Treasury (1985).
Capital/Type and Source
Share of Capital Structure (percent)
Technology-
based firms Other firms
EquityInsiders 13.6 16.4
EquityUnaffiliated individuals 11.3 4.3
EquityVenture capitalists 9.8 5.1
EquityOther investors 19.1 3.9
DebtInsiders 2.2 6.9
DebtUnaffiliated individuals 4.0 3.5
DebtVenture capitalists 2.5 1.8
DebtBanks 19.5 28.0
DebtOther investors 18.0 30.152Poterba
insiders and unaffiliated individuals supplied 24.9 percent of the initial
capital as equity. Approximately 54 percent of the funds for these small
firms was supplied as equity. For nontechnology firms, the equity share
was 29.7 percent, with insiders and other individualssupplying 20.7
percent of the total capitalization. Venture capitalists accounted for only
one-sixth of the total equity flow. The importance of organized venture
capital has almost surely grown since this survey, as the industry's
resources have expanded rapidly. Freear and Wetzel (1988)study equity
financing for technology-based start-up firms headquartered in New En-
gland during the 1975-1986 period. Their results show that private indi-
viduals supplied 21% of the equity to their sample firms, while orga-
nized venture capital firms provided the remaining 79%. Clear patterns
also emerged in the time profile of financing, with individuals playing a
more important role in the early stages of venturefinancing. These data
suggest that a significant fraction of the funds for start-up firms is pro-
vided through informal channels, from initial participants in the firm.
The precise magnitude of this source of capital remains unclear, how-
ever. Nevertheless, most of the investors providingcapital through infor-
mal channels probably face capital gains tax liability on their returns.
The rapid growth in organized venture capital funding after the 1978
capital gains tax cuts has been widely cited as demonstrating the sensitiv-
ity of start-up ventures to tax policy. Organized venture capital consists
of three classes of institutions: independent venture capital funds, Small
Business Investment Companies (SBICs), and corporate subsidiaries.
Independent venture funds are typically limited partnerships. They con-
sist of a general partner or partners, who screen potential investments
and assist the management teams of firms the partnership has invested
in, as well as limited partners, who provide financial capital. Perez
(1986) reports that a typical venture partnership has a lifetime of be-
tween seven and ten years and provides general partners with a fee (2 or
3 percent of the partnership's initial capitalization) as well as a share
(often 20 percent) of the profits.
Small Business Investment Companies are licensed and regulated by
the Small Business Administration (SBA). They are essentially closed-
end investment trusts that provide both capital and managerial assis-
tance to start-up firms. The 1958 legislation authorizing SBICs allowed
these entities to borrow three dollars from the SBA at Treasury interest
rates for each dollar of equity capital they raised.5 Because the invest-
ment income of 5BICs is not taxable until it is distributed to sharehold-
Limits on the SBA's budget during the 1980s have reduced actual matching to well below
the theoretical maximum and have induced long queues for SBA funding.Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation53
TABLE 3
Composition of Venture Capital Funding Pool, 1977-1987
Private Total from:
indepen- Corpo-Individ-
dent rate ual Untaxed
venture subsid-inves- inves-
Total funds SBICsiaries tors tors Others
Source: Venture Capital Journal, various issues. Entries are measured in millions of 1987 dollars.
ers, SBICs provide an attractive investment vehicle for investors such as
banks and insurance companies who wish to defer taxable income.
Many SBICs have outstanding liabilities, such as debt to the SBA, and as
a result their investment in new firms often takes the form of convertible
debt rather than equity. Individuals may invest through SBICs, but they
have not been primary suppliers of capital through this channel.
The final investment channel, corporate subsidiaries, provides a mecha-
nism for large corporations to become involved in developments at start-
up firms. These subsidiaries, such as Exxon Enterprises andGevenco
(General Electric), are often designed to provide diversification or innova-
tion to their corporate parent. Venture capital investments through corpo-
rate subsidiaries face corporate tax rates, so they should be much less
sensitive to changes in the individual income tax treatment of capital gains
than investments through independent venture partnerships.6
Table 3 presents information on the stock of capital in the venture
capital industry during the last decade. At the end of 1987, the total
capitalization of the venture industry was $29 billion, with almost $23
billion of the total supplied through independent venture partnerships.
Commitments to such partnerships have increased fifteenfold during the
last decade, while funds channeled through SBICs and corporate subsid-
iaries have increased approximately one-and-one-half times. These num-
6Changes in the capital gains tax rate may affect the cost of capital of the parent firm,
thereby altering the horizon over which it plans investments and affecting the resources
allocated to venture subsidiaries.
19774408 1551 1070 1787 776 466 3166
19806180 2472 1923 1785 1102 1054 4024
1981 6262 3256 2003 2003 1352 1434 3476
19828945 5179 1530 2236 1698 2093 5154
198313,707 9289 1586 2832 2507 3595 7605
198417,822 12,896 1790 3136 3032 4994 9262
1985 20,774 15,091 2053 3630 3349 5994 11,431
1986 24,945 18,714 2160 4071 3758 7904 13,283
1987 29,020 22,750 2310 3960 4262 9962 14,97654Poterba
TABLE 4
Venture Capital Supplied to Private Independent Funds, 1979-1987
Source: Venture Economics, Venture capital yearbook 1988, and previous issues of Venture capital journal.
bers understate the amount of funds supplied to new firms, since they
ignore funds provided through the informal sector (for example, from
the firm's founder).
While individual investors are important suppliers of capital to the
independent venture funds (IVFs), they account for less than half of the
investments through this channel. Table 4 presents data on the flow of
new commitments to these independent funds for each of the last ten
years. In 1987, individual investors supplied only 12 percent of the new
funds to independent venture capital partnerships. Untaxed pension
funds and foundations accounted for 49 percent of the IVFs. This is
slightly smaller than their 56 percent share in 1986 and notably higher
than their combined 24 percent share in 1978. Another 26 percent of the
funding for IVFs in 1987 came from corporations, including both insur-
ance companies (15 percent) and other large corporations (11 percent).











Real value of funds committed ($1987 million)
1978 52.8 112.7 56.3 59.9 35.2 31.7
1979 78.9 58.6 10.2 38.2 40.7 25.5
1980263.3 154.3 118.0 72.6 163.4 136.2
1981249.7 249.7 162.8 108.6 184.6 130.3
1982543.8 346.0 230.7 214.2 197.7 115.3
19831194.0 808.8 462.2 616.3 462.2 308.1
19841189.0 524.6 454.6 629.5 489.6 209.8
1985805.5 317.3 268.5 561.4 292.9 195.3
19861705.0 409.2 341.0 375.1 375.1 204.6
19871638.0 504.0 630.0 546.0 462.0 420.0
Percentage of total commitments
1978 15 32 16 17 10 9
1979 31 23 4 15 16 10
1980 29 17 13 8 18 15
1981 23 23 15 10 17 12
1982 33 21 14 13 12 7
1983 31 21 12 16 12 8
1984 34 15 13 18 14 6
1985 33 13 11 23 12 8
1986 50 12 10 11 11 6
1987 39 12 15 13 11 10Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation55
foreign investors, who are not affected bythe individual capital gains
tax.
The finding that 88 percent of thefunding for independent venture
funds arises from investors who are notaffected by the personal income
tax casts doubt on thesupply-of-funds view of how the capital gains tax
affects venture investment, especially inorganized venture capital.7 The
last three columns of Table 3 present summarystatistics on the fractions
of the venture capital pool that canbe traced to different classes of
investors.8 Individual investors accountedfor 14.7 percent of the stock of
venture capital funds at the endof 1987, while 34.3 percent was pro-
vided by investors who faced no taxliabilitypension funds or non-
profit institutions. The individual investor categoryis a subset of the P/F
category, as is the untaxed investorcategory. Investors facing "other"
tax regimes include those facingthe corporation tax in the U.S. as well as
those who are taxed in foreign countries.These investors provided the
balance of the funds to venture start-ups.
These data imply that if the 1978 capital gains taxreduction had never
been enacted and individual investment inIVFs had remained constant
in real terms at its 1977 level, the venturecapital industry in 1987 would
have been only 12 percent smallerthan it actually was. These calcula-
tions err on the side of overstating theimpact of the capital gains tax on
the organized venture capital industry,since some investors allocated
funds from Keogh plans, IRAs, or othertax-favored vehicles to venture
investments.
The data in Table 4 are inconsistentwith the view that rapid growth in
venture capital funding was due toincreased investment by taxable
individuals. Between 1978 and 1979, thepension fund share of new
commitments to IVFs increased from 15 to31 percent, and it has re-
mained at roughly this level for the last nine years.As a result, between
1978 and 1987, when the annual flowof venture funding increased by a
factor of five, pension fund investmentsincreased by a factor of thirteen.
Investment by individuals and familiesincreased by a factor of less than
two. Since most other investorcategories maintained their share of the
venture funding pool over thisperiod, their contributions increased ap-
proximately fivefold. During the early 1980s, whenhistorically low capi-
An alternative explanations suggested to meby Henry Aaron, is that the level of individ-
ual investment in venture capital is low preciselybecause of capital gains taxes.
These calculations assume that half of all investmentin IVFs at the end of 1977 had been
contributed by individuals. This is substantially largerthan the flow investment share of
individuals at the end of the 1970s and is designed tobe a conservative (that is, large)
estimate of their importance.56Poterba
tal gains tax rates should have made individual investmentin venture
projects especially attractive, venture investments by individualsdid not
keep pace with those of investors who did not facesimilar tax incentives.
The preceding analysis has focusedon capital supplied to firms in
the first few years of their existence. Even if individualinvestors do not
play a central role in this stage of theventure capital process, one
might still argue that they are important, because theysupport the
market for initial public offerings by start-up firms.Empirical evidence
on the ownership of traded equity in newly traded firms is, unfortu-
nately, unavailable.9
The results in this section suggest serious difficultieswith the argu-
ment that the organized venture capital industry hasgrown in the last
decade because of reduced taxeson the investing public. While some
venture investors are affected by the individual capitalgains tax, the
rapid growth of independent venture partnershipswas not driven by an
expanded supply of funds from individual investors.
3. THE DEMAND FOR VENTURE CAPITALFUNDING:
INCENTIVES FOR ENTREPRENEURS
The second potential link between capital gainstax rates and the level of
venture capital activity operates through the demand forventure capital
funds. This channel involves the occupational decisionsof potential entre-
preneurs. These individuals can work as middle- or high-levelmanagers
for large firms, or they can start theirown firms in a senior management
position.l° Most of the compensation received by middlemanagers in
large firms is wage income, while much of thecompensation in small
start-up enterprises is likely to be taxed as capital gains. Byaltering the
relative tax burdens on wage and capital gains income,reductions in the
capital gains tax make entrepreneurshipmore attractive and therefore
raise the demand for venture funds.11
The effective capital gains tax burden on stock market investorsis a subject of some
controversy. Stiglitz (1983) discusses a number of strategies that individualinvestors could
use to reduce their taxes or even to convert the tax to a subsidy. Poterba (1987)provides
empirical evidence suggesting only a small fraction of investors takeadvantage of these trading strategies.
10 The arguments of this section apply bothto the founder, the individual who raises
capital and becomes the CEO of the new firm, and to top-levelemployees who receive a
large fraction of their compensation in the form of stockoptions or other equity claims.
" This view implies thata key determinant of venture capital activity should be the ratio of
(l-z), the aftertax income from a dollar of capital gains,to (l-t), the marginal tax rate on wage
and salary income. This differs from the view that the supply ofventure capital is affected by
capital gains taxes, since it predicts that the ratio of (lTmt), theaftertax income from portfolio
assets such as bonds, and (l-z) should be central for the supply ofventure funds.Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation57
The principal objection to the demand-side linkbetween capital gains
taxes and venture capital involves thedivergence between the statutory
tax rate on realized gains and theeffective tax rate on accruing gains.
Because gains are often realized many yearsafter they accrue, and taxes
are due only on realization,the government in effect provides investors
with interest-free loans on unrealized gains.12The effective burden of
the capital gains tax therefore depends on thelength of time a gain is
held without realization. Particularly for assetsheld for long periods of
time, the effective tax rate may be far lessthan the statutory rate. This
underscores the importance of obtaininginformation on the time hori-
zon over which corporatefounders and early employees realize their
accrued gains. This section presents ifiustrativecalculations suggesting
that the response of the effective tax rate tochanges in the statutory
capital gains tax rate is less than point-for-point. Forholding periods of
five to eight years, the effective rate may betwo-thirds of the statutory
rate.
3.1 The Venture Capital Timetable
To calibrate the holding periods that arelikely to be important for start-
up firms, Figure 1 describesthe stylized growth process for a new firm.13
Initial infusions of capital from insiders, venturecapitalists, and banks
can occur in the start-up as well asthe early growth stages. In 1985, 45
percent of disbursements from independentventure capital funds was
to firms in the start-up or pre-start-up stages,with another 26 percent to
firms in the early growth stage andapproximately 15 percent to firms
experiencing accelerating growth.
Investments by venture capitalists can follow anumber of different
trajectories. Roughly one start-up in five becomessuccessful enough to
warrant a public offering of equity; two infive are ultimately merged into
larger firms; one in five becomes asuccessful small business, with the
venture capitalists selling their equitystake to the managers; and one in
five must be liquidated or written off (Perez,1986). For venture inves-
tors, the elapsed time between theirinitial investment and their disposi-
tion of the firm is between three and five years.Data on average holding
periods, by type of termination, for a sampleof 433 start-up firms ana-
lyzed by Venture Economics are shown below:
12 Alan Auerbach (1988) discusses the impact of holding periods oneffective tax burdens
and provides a novel suggestion on how to implementaccrual taxation while taxing only
realized gains.
13 This diagram is drawn from Perez (1986), p. 123.58Poterba
Type of termination Average holding period Average return
Initial public offering 4.2 years 610 percent
Acquisition by another 3.7 years 70 percent
firm
Company buy-back 4.7 years 110 percent
Write-off 3.7 years 100 percent
Using the rough proportions suggested above for these outcomes, the
average annual return to venture investments in this sample is more
than 20 percent per year. This may be an unusual period, since itwas
marked by strong economic growth and a rapid rise in the stock market,
but that cannot be evaluated.
The relatively short investment horizons of venture projectssuggest
that investors are unlikely to receive substantial benefits from deferring
capital gains. A similar argument applies to other employees who forgo
wage income to work for a start-up firm: they are likely to realize at least
part of their gains soon after the firm goes public, to financeconsump-
tion or to repay debts. Even corporate foundersmay not have lifetime
horizons; in many cases, the entrepreneur provesmore adept at starting
than at managing a growing firm, and he or she leaves the firm shortly
after it reaches the "stable growth" phase.
CASH FLOW
RED/S tart upiEarly GrowthI Accelerating
Phase Phase Growth Phase
FIGURE 1. Time Profile of Venture Capital Project
Mature Phase
TIME3.2 Effective Capital Gains Tax Burdens
The difference between statutory and effective ratesof capital gains tax
can be formalized by assumingthat an asset appreciates at a constant
nominal rate g + t, where g denotes the real growth rateand t is the
inflation rate. Realized gains are taxed at a statutory rate t,and T de-
notes the investor's holding period. Theaftertax wealth of an investor
who allocates one dollar to this asset in period zero andrealizes his gain
T years later is
Wreatization = eiz)Tr5(e(g)T - 1) = Tg + (lT5)e (1)
By comparison, if the asset's nominal returneach year had been taxed on
accrual at rate;, then the investor's wealth in period Twould be
Waccmai = eXa)T. (2)
The rate of accrual taxation;* that yields the same year = T wealth as a
tax at rate Tg on realizations can befound by equating (1) and (2):
= 1 - [l!(g+ir)T]*ln[Tg +(l_Tg)e(+)T}. (3)
Table 5 presents estimates of the effective accrual tax rate,;*, for a
variety of different holding periods and asset returns.Each case assumes
that the statutory tax rate on realizations is 28 percent.The entries show
TABLE 5




g = .05 .256
g = .10 .233
g = .15 .213
g = .20 .195
g = .05 .221
g = .10 .202
g = .15 .185
g = .20 .169
Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation59
Source: Author's calculations assuming statutory tax rate of .28 onrealizations.
Holding period
10 years 20 years 40 years










that for holding periods of longer than twentyyears, the effective ac-
crual rate is less than half of the statutory rate. Fora five-year horizon,
the effective accrual rate is nearly five percentage points lower thanthe
statutory rate, but it still constitutes a significant tax burden. For entre-
preneurs who intend to maintain their positions for periods of twenty to
forty years, the 1986 increase in the capital gains tax rate alters the
effective tax rate by less than three percentage points. For those who plan
to realize gains in five years, however, the effective tax rate rises bymore
than five percentage points.
The accrual tax rates in Table 5 equate the nominal returns under
realization and accrual taxation. This ignores the important effectof
taxing nominal gains on the investor's real return. If real gainswere taxed
at rate;, then the investor's wealth in year T would be
accrual,real =es(lTa))T. (4)
Equating (4) and (1) defines the rate of accrual taxationon real returns
that corresponds to a given tax on nominal realizations.
Table 6 presents estimates of ;* assuming inflation rates of4 and 8
percent per year, and shows that effective tax rates exceed the statutory
rate in many cases. When the inflation rate is 8 percentper year, an asset
yielding a 5 percent real return faces a real tax rate of 57.5percent if the
TABLE 6
Effective Real Accrual Capital Gains Tax Rates
Source: Author's calculations assuming statutory tax rate of .28 on realizations. These calculationsindi-
cate the percentage reduction in the real return as a result of taxing accrued nominal gains at realization.
The real tax on debt, in the last column, is the effective tax rate on real interestpayments for the given
inflation rate, assunmig g equals the real interest rate and that nominal interest rates rise one-for-one
with inflation.
Holding period Real tax
on debt 5 years 10 years20 years40 years
Inflation Rate = 4 percent
.428 .363 .266 .159 .504
.304 .237 .153 .082 .392
.251 .181 .107 .055 .355
.218 .147 .081 .041 .336
Inflation Rate = 8 percent
.575 .456 .300 .163 .728
.363 .266 .159 .082 .504
.283 .194 .108 .055 .429










g = .20Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation61
gain is realized in five years, and30percent if the asset is held as long as
twenty years. If the appreciating asset has a higher real return, the
inflation-induced increase in effective tax rates is smaller. For an asset
with a15percent real return and a five-year holding period, the effective
real tax rate is28.3percent if inflation is8percent, and25.1percent if
inflation is 4 percent per year. Even with the benefits provided by tax
deferral, the real effective tax rate is near the statutory tax rate when the
inflation rate is substantial.
The high effective tax burden in inflationary times is not unique to the
capital gains tax, other types of capital income are also taxed heavily.
Consider a bond that pays a real interest rate r and a nominal rate i = r +
IT,with nominal interest income taxed at rate 6. The real aftertax return is
(1O)r -Oir, so the effective real tax rate is=O(1+IT!r).The last
column in Table 6 reports this effective tax burden for projects with differ-
ènt pretax returns. The effective tax rates on interest-paying investments
are substantially higher than those on assets that yield capital gains. For
investors in gain-producing venture partnerships, inflation tends to re-
inforce the relative attractiveness of obtaining capital gains rather than
ordinary income. For entrepreneurs thinking about forgoing wage and
salary income to earn capital gains on a start-up firm, however, the
inflation-induced elevation of capital gains tax rates is a serious concern.
The effective burden of the capital gains tax is compounded by another
feature of the federal income tax: the provision of imperfect loss-offsets. If
an entrepreneur is part of a successful venture, the government will tax
his or her gains. If the venture fails and the individual's initial investment
becomes worthless, however, the entrepreneur can only deduct$3000of
losses per year from taxable income. The tax system therefore lowers the
mean return the entrepreneur expects on an investment in the start-up
firm. Given the high probability of losses in the venture industry, the
absence of perfect loss-offset may have a pronounced effect in raising
effective tax rates.
The foregoing calculations suggest that the capital gains tax affects the
relevant trade-off between wage and nonwage income for potential en-
trepreneurs. It affects the same choice for potential employees of start-
up firms, many of whom receive corporate stock rather than wages for
part of their compensation. For an entrepreneur who expects a15per-
cent real return each year on an investment and who plans to realize
those gains ten years after his or her firm starts business, an increase in
the statutory tax rate from20to28percent changes the effective tax rate
by approximately 4 percent.14 These calculations suggest that changes in
14 This calculation assumes a 4 percent inflation rate.62Poterba
the capital gains tax may have incentive effects on potential entrepre-
neurs. They also argue for focusing on the difference between tax rates
on labor income and those on capital gains to calibrate the tax system's
impact on the venture industry.
3.3 Qualifications Regarding Entrepreneurial Tax Burdens
The foregoing calculations ignore two aspects of the effective capital
gains tax burden and hence of the differential tax burdens on wages
versus other types of income. The first is step-up of basis at death. If an
investor dies and bequeaths an asset with an accrued gain, the heir is not
liable for capital gains tax. This provision of the tax code may be espe-
daily important for individuals who consider starting their own compa-
nies. A typical lifecycle scenario for such individuals might be starting
the firm, subsequently managing the firm as CEO, eventually retiring
while still holding a significant equity stake and remaining an important
force on the board of directors, and finally dying and leaving an impor-
tant equity claim to heirs. The effective capital gains tax for this scenario
is zero, regardless of the asset growth rate.15
Second, the implicit argument underlying the calculation of capital
gains tax rates for entrepreneurs is that their choice is between salary
income in a large firm and capital gains income in a start-up. This over-
states the difference between the two types of employment, since some
high-level managers in large firms receive at least part of their compensa-
tion in the form of stock options or other tax-favored instruments. The
1987 Arthur Young Survey of executive compensation reveals that approxi-
mately one-third of senior managers in large (top 1000) U.S. firms re-
ceive nonqualified stock options, a similar fraction are eligible to receive
incentive stock options, and approximately one in ten receives stock
appreciation rights. Over 40 percent of these managers, however, are
employed by firms with no organized accumulation plans to provide
employees with tax-sheltered income.
If tax considerations were paramount issues in workers' evaluation of
compensation packages, one would expect large firms to attempt to
structure their payment systems for middle managers to provide capital
gains. The relatively limited use of such plans is probably the result of
nontax considerations involving risk-sharing and agency problems. The
return on most of the instruments that provide income as capital gains,
such as stock options, is linked to firm performance. An employee who
exchanges the certainty of wage compensation for an equal amount of
15 It is difficult to gauge the fraction of accrued gains that escapes taxation because of basis
step-up at death. The Congressional Budget Office (1988b) estimates that the annual loss
from net gains that are transferred at death is approximately $17 billion.Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation63
expected capital gain income therefore bears some risk assOciated with
the firm's performance. For a top executive in a small firm, whose behav-
ior may affect the level of share prices, the risk of share price movements
beyond his control is therefore smaller. Small firms may therefore be
able to provide a higher share of compensation as capital gains.
Despite these limitations, changes in the capital gains tax rate may
have an important effect on the supply of entrepreneurs and employees
available for venture capital funding. This link between tax policy and
venture capital seems more plausible than one focused on the supply of
venture funds.
4. THE SMALL WORLD OF VENTURE CAPITAL
Reductions in the capital gains tax are likely to raise the attractiveness of
undertaking venture investments for some investors and for entrepre-
neurs. Informed debate on such proposals must recognize that an
across-the-board cut in capital gains tax rates, however, is a relatively
blunt instrument for stimulating venture activity. Most of the benefits of
such a tax reduction would accrue to investors in assets other than
venture capital firms.
The diverse asset mix of realized capital gains is illustrated in Table 7,
which reports the asset composition of net capital gains in the three
years since 1970 for which the IRS reports detailed data. Less than one-
quarter of realized capital gains reflects appreciation of common stock,
and venture capital activity is only a small share of this equity compo-
nent. Equities account for a somewhat higher share of taxable gains
roughly one-third in 1981because a substantial share of realized gains
is untaxed gains on personal residences. Real property, both real estate
and other assets such as business equipment, account for a larger share
of net gains than does common stock in each of the survey years. The
mix of gains varies across survey years in part because ex post apprecia-
tion rates on different assets are not constant through time. In all of the
years, however, common stocks are the largest category of gain-
producing assets, but they constitute a small share of total taxable
gains.16
The asset mix of realized gains largely reflects the asset composition of
16Data on the composition of realized gains for 1985 and 1986 are not yet available. They
may show a significant increase in the share of gains due to corporate equities. The
explosive increase in capital gain realizations in 1986 was largely the result of pre-
announced changes in the statutory tax rate (see Auerbach, 1988). Since it is easier to
manipulate the timing of capital gains on corporate stock than on many other assets, a
particularly high fraction of the gains realized for tax-timing reasons may be on equities.64Poterba
TABLE 7
Asset Composition of Realized Capital Gains
Calculations are based on U.S. Treasury (1980), Brame and Gilmour (1982), and Clark and Paris (1985).
Depreciable property includes sale and involuntary conversion of depreciable business and nonbusi-
ness assets, as well as other Section 1231 property. The calculations for taxable gains treat gains on
personal residences as untaxed.
household portfolios. Households held $2.2 trillion of corporate equities
at the end of 1987, roughly the same amount as their holdings of invest-
ment real estate ($2.1 triffion) and twice their holdings of corporate and
government bonds ($1.1 trillion). Owner-occupied real estate accounts
for over $4 trillion of asset holdings. The appreciation rates over the last
two decades indicate that real estate has yielded larger capital gains than
common stock. While some of the observed gains during the last two
decades reflect relative price changes that may not occur again, there is
little reason to expect the capital-gains-weighted role of corporate equi-
ties to rise significantly in the future.
The pooi of venture capital funds under management in 1987 totaled
approximately $29 billion, or less than 1 percent of the value of U.S.
1973 1977 1981
A. Shares of total realized gains
Common stock 14.8 14.7 24.8
Other securities -0.8 0.5 -1.8
Sales of partnerships 7.9 9.2 6.7
Nonresidential real estate 11.1 9.5 14.8
Capital gain distributions 3.1 2.3 1.4
Farms and timber 1.7 2.2 3.4
Depreciable assets 12.5 17.7 11.4
Personal residences 15.5 14.9 25.3
Installment sales 14.0 8.5 8.1
Other assets 20.3 20.5 5.9
B. Shares of realized taxable gains
Common stock 17.5 17.2 33.2
Other securities -0.9 0.6 -2.4
Sales of partnerships 9.3 10.8 9.0
Nonresidential real estate 13.1 11.2 19.8
Capital gain distributions 3.6 2.7 1.9
Farms and timber 2.0 2.6 4.5
Depreciable assets 14.8 20.8 15.2
Installment sales 16.6 10.0 10.8
Other assets 24.0 24.1 8.0Venture Capital and Capital Gains Taxation65
equity markets.17 This suggests the relatively small share of venture-
related gains in total realizations. The flow of initial public offerings
(IPOs) of new firms suggests a similar conclusion. In 1987, for example,
the aggregate flow of IPOs totaled $24.2 billion.18 The value of venture-
backed IPOs is estimated at $1.8 billion (Venture Economics, 1988). Even if
all the proceeds of the venture-backed sales were gains to taxable inves-
tors, the resulting capital gains tax liability could not have exceeded $520
million. The actual tax liability was probably far smaller, less than $350
million, since over 40 percent of the venture capital pool is supplied by
untaxed investors. Similar calculations for 1985 and 1986, years for
which the total flow of realized gains is known, indicate the venture-
backed IPOs accounted for 0.5 percent and 0.65 percent, respectively, of
realized gains.19 Even the total flow of initial public offerings, $22.4 bil-
lion in 1986, is small relative to the more than $320 billion of realized
gains. These statistics ifiustrate the basic point that a subsidy to all appre-
ciating assets, such as an across-the-board reduction in capital gains
rates, largely benefits nonventure capital assets.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The previous sections do not estimate the sensitivity of either the supply
of or demand for venture capital funding with respect to capital gains tax
rates. Nevertheless, they attempt to provide a framework for under-
standing the links between capital gains taxation and venture capital.
Since reductions in the capital gains tax rate raise the attractiveness of
venture capital projects for some investors and for potential entrepre-
neurs, such reductions are likely to exert some positive effect onthe
level of venture activity. But the foregoing analysis does suggest that
naive arguments based on the assumption that all investors and all
entrepreneurs are taxed at the statutory capital gains rate are inappropri-
ate. At most, half of the seed money to finance start-up firms is provided
by investors who face the individual income tax treatment of capital
gains. Moreover, a five-percentage-point change in the statutory tax rate
17 Most of the venture capital funds are not invested in the stock market. The relative
magnitude of the stock market and the venture capital industry ifiustrates the general
principle that this industry is small in comparison to the pool of assets generating capital
gains.
18 Going Public: The IPO Reporter 12 (January 1988), p. 1.
19 Even assuming that venture investors outside the organized venture industry market
are five times more numerous than those in the industry, as Table 2 suggests, only 3
percent of realized gains are related to venture capital.66Poterba
on realized gains implies roughly a three-percentage-point change in the
effective tax rate for the entrepreneur.
These data do not resolve the broader question of the opitmal tax rate
on capital gains realized in venture investments or the optimal rate on
gains more generally. If arguments for unusual social externalities in the
venture capital field prove convincing, then policy debate in a deficit-
strapped economy wifi inevitably turn to targeted subsidies that affect
only venture investments. Such policies would induce two types of dis-
tortions. First, if capital gains on equity in new firms were taxed at a
lower rate than gains on established firms, existing firms would face
strong incentives to spin off their subsidiaries doing R & D or entering
new lines of business. This might result in inefficient organizational
structures for some firms. Firms or partnerships engaged in one line of
business (say real estate investing) might face strong incentives to
branch into other businesses that would enable them to qualify for subsi-
dies that are targeted to new ventures. Second, firms might attempt to
reincorporate to take advantage of reduced tax rates for "new" firms. It
would be difficult to design tracing rules that would prevent established
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